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LABOR ACTIVITY AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS: A
NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY
The clash between the national labor laws' and the federal antitrust
laws2 has generated legislative and judicial attempts to accomodate the
conflicting policies.' The national labor policy encourages union organiza-
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976); Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-183, 185-187, 191-197, 557 (1976); Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
2 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976); Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
Initially the Sherman Act was applied broadly to condemn virtually every collective
activity of labor as an unlawful restraint of trade. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908). But see Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I, 39 CoLuM. L. REv. 1283,
1285-89 (1939) (Congress never intended Sherman Act to apply to labor union activity).
Congressional response to this strict application of the antitrust laws to the labor unions was
the enactment of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976), designed to
protect labor unions from antitrust liability by specifically excluding labor as an article of
commerce and drastically limiting the injunctive power of federal courts in labor disputes.
These sections of the Clayton Act were designed to exempt labor unions from antitrust
liability when carrying out legitimate objectives, see United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219, 229-30 (1941), but the Court seriously limited their effect in Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), by interpreting sections 6 and 20 to protect only the existence
and lawful activities of union organizations and preventing application of the antitrust laws
only to a labor dispute between employees and their immediate employer. Id. at 468-69; see,
e.g., Bedford Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925). Concerned that the policy of the Clayton
Act was being frustrated by cases such as Duplex, Congress clarified its position in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1976), by proclaiming the public policy in favor of
collective bargaining and organization of individual workers for their mutual aid or protec-
tion. 29 U.S.C § 102 (1976). Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act which created
the National Labor Relations Board and reaffirmed the labor policy encouraging labor organi-
zation and collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). However, Congress failed to
integrate the Norris-LaGuardia and National Labor Relations Acts with the Sherman Act by
not specifying how the conflicting statutes were to be applied in relation to the other. In Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), the Court avoided the statutory integration
problem but recognized the congressional labor policy by holdinig that only union activity
having the intended effect of restraint upon price structures and competitive conditions in
the product market was subject to antitrust sanctions. Id. at 493. However, the Court inter-
preted the Norris-LaGuardia, Clayton, and Sherman Acts interdependently in United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), and exempted union's activities from antitrust liability
only as long as the union acted out of self-interest and did not combine with nonlabor groups
to achieve its goals. Id. at 232. In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945),
the Court declared that a union is susceptible to antitrust penalties if it conspires with
employers to restrict competition in the product market even though the union could have
legitimately brought about the same effects acting unilaterally. Id. at 810. While earlier cases
shared the common element of union conspiracies with nonlabor groups in pursuit of nonlabor
goals, Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), raised doubts as to the necessity of the allegation
of a conspiracy for antitrust liability to arise. In Pennington, the Court held that the legiti-
mate aim of the union to standardize working conditions did not legitimize goals forbidden
by the antitrust laws even without any allegation of a conspiracy. 381 U.S. at 665-66. In Jewel
Tea, the Court carefully delineated a balancing process and concluded that a union can lose
its exemption from the antitrust laws by its own unilateral act. The balancing test consisted
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tion and collective bargaining to improve labor conditions and to promote
industrial harmony.4 The purpose and effect of every labor organization is
to eliminate competition in the labor market over wages and working con-
ditions.' A union's use of its power to eliminate competition in the labor
market also may affect competition in the product market.6 The national
antitrust policy, on the other hand, seeks to preserve a competitive busi-
ness economy by prohibiting restraints on competition in business and
commercial transactions. 7 The balancing of these two policies has resulted
in a two-prong, statutory and nonstatutory, labor exemption from anti-
trust liability. The basic sources of organized labor's statutory exemption
are sections 61 and 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,'"
of weighing the relative impact the agreement would have on the product market against the
legitimate union aim. 381 U.S. at 692-93. The Jewel Tea Court characterized the alleged
"conspiracy" with nonlabor groups as a legitimate bargain over terms and conditions of
employment rather than as the forbidden Hutcheson-type conspiracy. Id. at 695-96. See
generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
621-38 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN]; L. SuLLVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
ANTITRUST 723-31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SuLuvAN]; Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws
- A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Cox]; Meltzer,
Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 659 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Meltzer]; Moeller, Employee Rights and Antitrust Liability: Organized
Labor's Exemption After Connell, 48 MIss. L.J. 713 (1977); Winter, Collective Bargaining and
Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Winter]; Note, The Labor Antitrust Conflict, 27 BAYLOR L. REv.
812 (1975); Note, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After Connell, 36 OHIO S.L.J. 852 (1975);
Note, Labor Law - Antitrust - Application of Sherman Act to Labor Union, 50 TULANE L.
REv. 418 (1976); Comment, Labor's Exemption From Federal Antitrust Laws: The Diminish-
ing Protection For Union Activity, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 620 (1976).
29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151 (1976) (purpose and policy of the national labor acts); see Modem
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Holly-General Co., 305 F.2d
670 (9th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958).
1 Cox, supra note 3, at 254. Chief Justice Taft observed in American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921) that:
[Labor unions] were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single
employee was helpless- in dealing with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily
on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused
to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the
employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give
laborers an opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.
Id. at 209.
1 Union success in organizing employees and the resulting institutionalization of wages
and other terms and conditions of employment affect price competition among employers by
setting a floor for the employer's labor cost. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfit-
ters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40
ANTITRUST L.J. 233 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Handler].
SuLLvAN, supra note 3, at 14. Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares contracts, combi-
nations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade to be unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 2
forbids monopolization, combinations or conspiracies to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares that unfair methods of competition
in commerce are unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
O 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
O 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
,0 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
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which declare that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade. The Acts exempt specific union activities, including
secondary picketing and boycotts, from the operation of the antitrust
laws." In attempting to reconcile the policies underlying the labor and
antitrust statutes, courts also have recognized a nonstatutory exemption.
12
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy favor-
ing the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and
working conditions.'" Union success in organizing workers and standardiz-
ing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers," but
the goals of federal labor law would be frustrated if this effect on price
competition was held to violate the antitrust laws.'5 The nonstatutory
exemption reflects the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that the proper
accomodation of the national labor policy and the national antitrust policy
requires tolerance for the decrease in business competition resulting from
the standardization of wages and working conditions. 6 The Supreme Court
reviewed the scope of the nonstatutory exemption as it applies to
employer-union agreements in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 1OO.1
In Connell, the Court indicated that union-employer agreements that
" See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22
(1975); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). The statutory exemption does not
protect concerted action or agreements between union and nonlabor parties. UMW v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965). The courts have been divided on exactly what constitutes
a conspiracy with a nonlabor group. Some have required union involvement in an indepen-
dent business conspiracy. E.g., Greenstein v. National Skirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp.
681, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). But see McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1956)
(union's successful coercion of boat owner's association sufficient to constitute conspiracy).
See generally Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66
COLUM. L. Rav. 742 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Labor's Antitrust Exemption].
12 The Supreme Court has recognized that a proper accomodation between the congres-
sional policy favoring collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act and the
congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets requires that some union-
employer agreements be accorded a limited non-statutory exemption. Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steammfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. at 622; Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
3 See note 4 supra.
11 See note 6 supra.
"1 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
1 Id.; see UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 692-93 (1965). Labor policy does not require that a
union have freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among those who employ its
members. Thus, while the statutory exemption allows unions to accomplish some restraints
by acting unilaterally, e.g., American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968),
the nonstatutory exemption offers no similar protection when a union and a nonlabor party
agree to restrain competition in the business market. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,
325 U.S. 797, 812 (1945); Cox, supra note 3, at 270-71; Meltzer, supra note 3, at 670-78.
17 421 U.S. 616 (1975). Connell is the first case in which the terms statutory and nonstatu-
tory exemption have been used. See Comment, Labor Antitrust Law After Connell Construc-
tion Co., 35 FED. B.J. 133, 137 (1976) (arguing classification will help clear confusion in area
because commentators more likely to focus on source of exemption).
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come within the parameters of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) '5
may be protected automatically from antitrust liability by the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption. Nevertheless, the Court held that an agreement
between Connell Construction Company and Local 100, which obligated
Connell to subcontract work exclusively to subcontractors who had a
collective bargaining agreement with Local 100, was not immune from
antitrust prohibitions because the agreement was not authorized by the
construction industry proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA.'5 The Court
reached this conclusion because the agreement was outside the context of
a collective bargaining relationship and was not restricted to a particular
jobsite. ° The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 2' recently applied
the Connell decision to uphold subcontracting agreements between unions
and employers where a collective bargaining relationship existed between
the parties.2 2 Although the NLRB focused directly on the construction
proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA2 to determine the union's liability
under the labor laws, a union's liability for violation of the antitrust laws
in cases involving union-employer agreements permitted by the NLRA,
remains open for determination by the courts.2 4 If the courts interpret
Connell to exempt automatically any union-employer agreement allowed
by the NLRA from antitrust liability, agreements could be protected by
the nonstatutory labor exemption that have significant adverse effects on
the product market and that are neither directly related to the goals of the
national labor policy nor to the union's legitimate goals.2 However, if
Connell is interpreted to maintain the balance of the two conflicting poli-
cies, and only to protect union-employer agreements that potentially re-
strain competition resulting from the elimination of competition over
wages and working conditions, both policies would be given the effect
Congress intended.28 The balancing approach appears to be more consis-
Is 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
" See note 23 infra.
20 421 U.S. at 635; see text accompanying notes 29 & 39 infra.
21 The NLRB is the administrative agency given the exclusive jurisdiction to implement
the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156 (1976). See generally GORMAN, supra note 3, at 7-39.
22 Carpenters, Local 944, 99 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1978); Operating Eng'rs, Local 701, 99
L.R.R.M. 1589 (1978); Building & Constr. Trades Council, 99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978); Colorado
Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 99 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1978); see text accompanying notes 61-85 infra.
2 The construction industry proviso allows "an agreement between a labor organization
and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting
of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building,
structure, or other work." 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976); see note 42 infra.
24 An analysis of the interaction of antitrust and labor policy must take into account
three distinct factual contexts: 1) union activities; 2) employer-union agreements; and 3)
employer combinations. This note will focus on employer-union agreements. For a discussion
of union activities and employer combinations, see, e.g., Cox, supra note 3; Meltzer, supra
note 3; Sovern, Some Rumination on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley, 13 LAB.
L.J. 957 (1962); Note, Cooperative Collective Bargaining Conduct Among Trade Competitors
and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption from Antitrust Liabiltiy, 9 RUT. CAM. L.J. 477 (1978).
5 See text accompanying notes 86-95 infra.
26 See text accompanying notes 105-09 infra.
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tent with the Supreme Court's efforts to limit labor's restriction of the
product market to that strictly necessitated by the national labor policy.
21
In Connell, Plumbers Local 100 picketed Connell to compel Connell to
enter into an agreement with Local 100 to subcontract mechanical work
only to subcontractors who had a collective bargaining agreement with
Local 100.2 Local 100 did not have a collective bargaining agreement with
Connell and admitted that it was not attempting to become the represent-
ative for any of Connell's employees. 29 Under pressure of picketing, Connell
agreed to sign the subcontracting agreement with Local 100.10 Connell then
brought an action asserting that the agreement was invalid under sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.' Local 100 responded that its activities were
immune from federal antitrust statutes and that since the subcontracting
agreement was explicitly allowed by the construction industry proviso to
section 8(e) of the NLRA, antitrust policy must defer to the NLRA. 2 The
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court" holding that the union could be
subject to federal antitrust liability because the union-employer agreement
did not come within the statutory and nonstatutory exemptions from the
antitrust laws and was outside the parameters of the section 8(e) proviso.'4
The Connell Court stated that the statutory exemption only protected
" Leslie, Right to Control: A Study in Secondary Boycotts and Labor Antitrust, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 904, 915 (1976).
2 421 U.S. at 620. Local 100 was also a party to a multi-employer bargaining agreement
with the Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas, a group of about 75 general contrac-
tors. That multi-employer bargaining agreement contained a "most favored nations clause"
by which the union agreed that if the union granted a more favorable contract to any other
employer, the union would extend the same terms to all members of the Association. Id. at
619. "Most favored nation" clauses come from the jargon on international trade agreements.
See Kurt S. Adler, Inc. v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 943, 947 (Cust. Ct. 1972), affrd, 496
F.2d 1220 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (explaining most favored nation principle). "Most favored nation"
clauses are fairly common in labor contracts, especially those in the construction industry.
See Feller & Anker, Analysis of Impact of Supreme Court's Antitrust Holdings, 59 L.R.R.M.
103 (1965). See also Comment, Antitrust Law - Most Favored Nation Clause and Labor's
Antitrust Exemption, 19 J. Pus. L. 399, 404-09 (1977).
2421 U.S. at 620.
11 Id. at 620.
31 Id. at 620-21; see note 7 supra. Connell filed suit in state court to enjoin the picketing
as a violation of Texas antitrust laws. Local 100 removed the case to federal court. Connell
then signed the subcontracting agreement under protest and amended its complaint to claim
that the agreement violated the Sherman Act and was therefore invalid. Connell sought a
declaration to this effect and an injunction against any further efforts to force it to sign such
agreements. 421 U.S. at 620-21.
32 The District Court held that the subcontracting agreement was authorized by the
construction industry proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA and thus was exempt from antitrust
liability. 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court, holding that Local 100's goal of organizing nonunion subcontractors was a
legitimate union interest and that efforts toward that goal were therefore exempt from the
antitrust laws. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th
Cir. 1973).
"Id.
31 421 U.S. at 635.
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unilateral action by union groups. The Court noted that Local 100 was
engaged in concerted activity with Connell, a nonlabor group, and there-
fore the statutory exemption did not protect the union activity.5 In order
to determine whether the agreement was protected by the nonstatutory
exemption, the Court weighed the validity of the union's objective and the
reasonableness of its means against the extent to which the agreement
restricted competition. 6 Although admitting that the union's goal of or-
ganizing was legal,"7 the Court nevertheless determined that Local 100's
use of direct restraints on the product market to support its organizational
campaign was not a reasonable means of achieving its organizational goal
due to the agreement's serious anticompetitive effects.38 The Court also
noted that the union could not claim the exemption based on the strong
federal policy favoring collective bargaining because no collective bargain-
ing relationship had been sought in this case. 9 The Court therefore con-
cluded that the union activity contravened antitrust policy to a degree not
justified by national labor policy and thus was not protected by the nonsta-
tutory exemption."
The Connell Court then addressed the union's contention that the anti-
Id. at 621-22; see text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
' Id. at 623.
31 Id. at 625. The Connell Court stated that Local 100's goal of organizing as many
subcontractors as possible was legal even though a successful organizing campaign would
ultimately reduce competition that unionized employers face from nonunion firms. Id.
u Id. at 623-25. The Court stated that the agreements between Local 100, Connell, and
the other general contractors to contract or subcontract work only to firms that were parties
to an executed, current collective bargaining agreement with Local 100 indiscriminately
excluded nonunion subcontractors from a portion of the market. Id. at 623. The Connell Court
also determined that the multiemployer bargaining agreement between Local 100 and the
Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas was relevant in determining the effect that the
agreement between Local 100 and Connell would have on the business market. Id. The "most
favored nations" clause in the multiemployer agreement promised to eliminate competition
between members of the association and any other subcontractors that Local 100 might
organize. Thus, the subcontractors stood to benefit from any extension of Local 100's organi-
zation, and Local 100's method also sheltered the subcontractors from outside competition
in the portion of the market covered by subcontracting agreements between Local 100 and
general contractors. In that portion of the market, the restriction on subcontracting also
would eliminate competition in all subjects covered by the multiemployer agreement, even
on subjects unrelated to wages, hours, and working conditions. Id. at 624. The Court also
stated that the agreements Local 100 had with general contractors would give Local 100 power
to control access to the subcontracting market. Id. Since the agreements prohibited subcon-
tracting to any firm that did not have a contract with Local 100, Local 100 had complete
control over the subcontracting work offered by general contractors that had signed these
agreements. Such control could have significant adverse effects on the business market unre-
lated to the union's legitimate goals of organizing workers and standardizing working condi-
tions. For example, if the union thought the interests of its members would be served by
having fewer subcontractors competing for the available work, it could refuse to sign collective
bargaining agreements with marginal firms and could also exclude traveling subcontractors
by refusing to deal with them. Id. at 623-25.
3' Id. at 626; see text accompanying note 29 supra.
40 421 U.S. at 625.
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trust policy must defer to the NLRA because the Connell-Local 100 sub-
contracting agreement was explicitly allowed by the construction industry
proviso to section 8(e).4 Section 8(e) prohibits a union and an employer
from voluntarily agreeing to'engage in secondary boycotts in all industries
except the construction industry and the clothing industry.42 The construc-
" Id. at 626; see note 23 supra.
12 Section 8(e) of the NLRA states that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unen-
forceable and void; Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction indus-
try relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of
the construction, alternation, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other
work: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection (e) and section
8(b)(4)(B) the terms "any employer", "any person engaged in commerce or an
industry affecting commerce," and "any person" when used in relation to the terms
"any other employer", or "any other person" shall not include persons in the rela-
tion of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods
or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated
process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, That
nothing in this Act shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within
the foregoing exception.
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). The construction industry and the clothing industry were given
special treatment in 8(e) because of special problems inherent in those two industries. See
generally GoRMAN, supra note 3, at 270-73; Brinker, Hot Cargo Cases in the Construction
Industry Since 1958, 22 LAB. L.J. 690 (1971). If a subcontracting clause is unlawful under 8(e),
a strike or other coercive action to obtain that clause is an unfair labor practice under the
express language of section 8(b)(4). 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4) (1976). See International Org. of
Master, Mates and Pilots v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 896, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Amalgam-
ated Lighographers of Am., 309 F.2d 31, 42-43 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943
(1963).
Although a literal reading of section 8(e) would proscribe even the conventional "no
subcontracting" provision common in collective bargaining agreements whereby the employer
agrees to give work to bargaining unit employees rather than subcontract to another em-
ployer, the Board and courts have applied 8(e) to maintain the distinction between valid
primary activity and illegal secondary activity which is the basis of section 8(b)(4). The
Supreme Court set forth guidelines for construing section 8(e) to outlaw only agreements
having an unlawful secondary objective in National Woodwork Mrgr's Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 612 (1967). The National Woodwork Court stated that the touchstone in determining
whether the activity was primary was "whether the agreement or its maintenance is ad-
dressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees." Id.
at 645; see Carrier Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 1178 (2d Cir. 1976); Griffith Co.
v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1976); Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Etc., Local 638 v. NLRB,
521 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Local 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB, 430 F.2d
906 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally GoRMAN, supra note 3, at 264-70; Lesnick, The Gravamen
of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Secondary
Boycott]; Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4)
and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Job Security].
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tion industry proviso of section 8(e) permits an agreement between an
employer and a union to engage in a secondary boycott at a particular
jobsite.43 Although the specific language of the proviso" permits the type
of subcontracting agreement between Local 100 and Connell, the Court
discussed the statutory setting and the circumstances surrounding the
proviso" and concluded that Congress passed section 8(e) to plug the loop-
holes in section 8(b)(4).11 Section 8(b)(4) permits a union to encourage an
employer to voluntarily engage in a secondary boycott, but prohibits a
union from striking or picketing to coerce an employer to agree to a second-
ary boycott. 7 The Court stated that the construction industry proviso was
adopted to alleviate special problems in the construction industry. Those
special problems included picketing a single nonunion subcontractor on a
multi-employer building project and the frictions that may arise when
union men work alongside nonunion men on a particular jobsite.5 The
Court concluded that Congress intended the proviso to alleviate the special
problems encountered in the construction industry by limiting the con-
struction industry proviso by allowing subcontracting agreements only in
relation to work done on a particular jobsite, but did not allow construction
unions the free use of subcontracting agreements as a broad organizational
weapon."
The Connell Court stated the Local 100 sought the agreement with
Connell solely as a way of pressuring the mechanical subcontractors in the
Dallas area for recognition as the representative of their employees,"0 and
not to alleviate any of the problems the proviso was designed to eliminate.5'
The Court then analyzed Local 100's activity in light of the NLRA provi-
a 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976); see note 42 supra.
" See note 23 supra.
" 421 U.S. at 628-34. The Court noted its authority to go beyond the statute by citing
National Woodwork Mnf'rs Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), which stated the rule that
"a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers"'. Id. at 619 (quoting Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1891)).
11 421 U.S. at 628; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). Section 8(b) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to engage
in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal
in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities or . . . re-
strain a y person engaged in commerce, . . . where in either case an object thereof
is forcin or requiring any employer or selfemployed person to join any labor or
employer organization or to enter into agreement which is prohibited by subsection
(e) of this section. ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
47 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976); see Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Labor
Board, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
,s 421 U.S. at 629-30.
" Id. at 628-33.
50 Id. at 618-19.
51 Id.
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sions concerning organizational campaigns of all unions.2 The NLRA lim-
its "top down" organizing by prohibiting unions from using economic
weapons to force recognition from an employer regardless of the wishes of
his employees. 3 To construe the 8(e) proviso to allow construction unions
to seek subcontracting agreements from any general contractor vulnerable
to picketing could seriously undermine the limits on economic pressure
unions may use in aid of their organizational campaign. This construction
would result in the type of "top down" organizing the NLRA seeks to
prevent.54 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the section 8(e) proviso only
extended to "agreements in the context of collective-bargaining relation-
ships and . . . possibly to common-situs relationships on particular job-
sites as well."55 Since the agreement was outside the context of a collective
bargaining relationship and not limited to a particular jobsite, the Connell
Court concluded that Local 100's activity was not protected by the 8(e)
proviso.
Local 100's final contention was that, even if the subcontracting agree-
ment was not sanctioned by the construction iridustry proviso and was
therefore illegal under 8(e), the agreement could not be the basis of anti-
trust liability because the remedies of the NLRA were exclusive.57 In ana-
5 Id.; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-159 (1976). See generally GoRMAN, supra note 3, at 40-132,
220-39.
- 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). While the specific objective of Congress in enacting section 8(e)
was to prohibit "hot cargo" agreements in most industries, the section can be viewed as part
of Congress' overall objective of limiting "top down" organizational campaigns, which are
situations where a union boycotts an employer until his employees join the union. Section 7
of the NLRA gives employees the right to join a union, or refrain from joining one. 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1976). The subcontracting agreement in Connell could have forced the nonassociated
subcontractors to violate their employees' section 7 rights to refrain from union membership
because the employer would have been faced with the choice of either remaining nonunion
and being unable to compete, or coercing his employees into joining ihe union. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1976) (employer unfair labor practice to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in exercise of section 7 rights).
Congress futher manifested its disapproval of top down organizing by enacting section
8(b)(7) of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976). Section 8(b)(7) allows a union to picket
an employer whose employees are not represented by a union, but the union must file a
petition with the NLRB for a representative election within 30 days after the start of the
picketing. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). One of the major purposes for the requirement of
filing an election petition is to prevent the union's picketing from forcing the employer to
coerce his employees to join the union without an election, which would clearly violate section
7 and constitute an instance of top down organizing. See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amend-
ments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MwnN. L. Rav. 257, 262-63 (1960).
51 421 U.S. at 632-33.
' Id. at 636; see 21 VLANOVA L. Rav. 342, 350 (1976).
56 421 U.S. at 635; see text accompanying notes 29 & 39 supra.
421 U.S. at 633-34. The remedies for unfair labor practices under the NLRA include
NLRB orders t6 cease an desist from unfair labor practices and affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Section 303 of
the Labor Management Relations Act permits recovery of damages and cost of suit by anyone
injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of 8(b)(4). 29 U.S.C. § 187
(1976). Since the enactment of section 8(e), the Board and courts consistently have upheld
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lyzing the union's contention, the Court considered the legislative history
of the NLRA and concluded that Congress did not intend labor law reme-
dies for section 8(e) violations to be exclusive. The Court also reasoned that
antitrust remedies in cases like Connell would not lead to a result incon-
sistent with the remedial scheme of the NLRA.55 The Court therefore con-
cluded that Local 100's agreement may be the basis of a federal antitrust
suit because the agreement has a potential for restraining competition in
the business market in ways that would not follow naturally from elimina-
tion of competition over wages and working conditions."
Because the exact scope of labor's nonstatutory exemption from anti-
trust liability as applied to union-employer agreements was not explicitly
defined in Connell, and therefore remains to be clarified by the courts,
recent NLRB decisions applying the construction industry proviso to
union-employer agreements could substantially impair antitrust enforce-
ment. The NLRB held that agreements between unions and employers, in
which the employers agreed to subcontract only to subcontractors that
have a collective bargaining relationship with the union involved or are
signatories to the agreement, were within the parameters of the section 8(e)
proviso where a collective bargaining relationship existed. 0 Such agree-
ments indiscriminately exclude nonunion subcontractors from a portion of
the market even though their competitive advantages were not derived
from substandard wages and working conditions but rather were derived
from more efficient operating methods."' Since the NLRB only required the
existence of a collective bargaining relationship to afford section 8(e) pro-
tection, a court's interpretation of Connell automatically to protect any
agreement allowed by the NLRA from antitrust liability would require
courts to ignore the positive value of competition resulting from efficiency
that the antitrust laws strive to protect, in favor of deference to the NLRA,
where such curtailment is not a necessary effect of the elimination of
competition among workers nor required by the national labor policy.
contract provisions between employers and unions in the construction industry which permit
the employer to subcontract work to be performed at the site of the construction only to
subcontractors who are signatories to contracts either with a particular union or with unions
having jurisdiction over the type of work involved. Although the Board initially held that
picketing to obtain such union signatory contracts violated section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, such
holding were denied enforcement by several courts of appeals. Construction, Production &
Maintenance Laborers' Union, Local 383 & United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, Local 1089, 137 N.L.R.B. 1650 (1962), enforced in part, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963);
Essex County and Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters, Etc., 141 N.L.R.B. 858 (1963),
enforcement denied, 332 F.2d 636 (3rd Cir. 1964). See also Local 48 of Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
5' 421 U.S. at 634.
" Id. at 635.
,o Carpenters, Local 944, 99 L.R.R.M. 1580, 1585-86 (1978); Operating Eng'rs, Local 701,
99 L.R.R.M. 1589, 1592 (1978); Building and Constr. Trades Council, 99 L.R.R.M. 1593
(1978); Colorado Bldg. and Constr. Trades, 99 L.R.R.M. 1601, 1603-04 (1978).
,1 421 U.S. at 623.
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In Carpenters, Local 944,62 the NLRB held that the subcontracting
agreement between the union and the employer was lawful.13 In analyzing
the agreement sought by the union for compliance with the NLRA, the
Board considered whether the subcontracting clauses were primary or sec-
ondary in nature.64 If the union's objective was preservation of the em-
ployer's employees' work which had customarily been performed by them
or preventing the undermining of the work opportunities and standards of
the employees by subcontractors who do not meet the prevailing wage rates
and employees benefits covered by the agreement," the subcontracting
clause was primary and therefore automatically protected by section 8(e).61
However, if the agreements were tactically calculated to satisfy union
objectives elsewhere, the touchstone being whether the agreement is ad-
dressed to the labor relations of the employer vis-a-vis his own employees,
the agreements would be secondary and thus presumptively unlawful un-
less they came within the construction proviso to section 8(e). G7 Although
the union contended that the agreement was primary,8 the NLRB con-
cluded that they were secondary because the subcontracting clauses went
beyond the primary work preservation or area standards justification.'
Upon finding that the agreement was secondary, the NLRB then had to
determine the agreement's lawfulness under the construction proviso to
section 8(e). The NLRB examined the Court's decision in Connell and
concluded that either the existence of a collective bargaining relationship
between the parties or a clause covering only a particular jobsite would
satisfy the Connell test.7 0 Since the union and the employer had a pre-
existing collective bargaining relationship,7 ' the NLRB held that the sub-
contracting clause was protected by the 8(e) proviso.72
11 99 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1978).
13 Id. at 1588.
" Id. at 1583-85. It is well settled that contract clauses which are limted to primary
considerations are not proscribed by section 8(e) of the NLRA. National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 645 (1967); see note 42 supra.
65 Heavy, Highway, Bldg. and Constr. Teamsters Comm. for N. Cal., 227 N.L.R.B. 269,
270 (1976).
" Id.; see National Woodwork Mfr's Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); Carrier Air
Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 1178 (2d Cir. 1976); Griffith Co. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 1194
(9th Cir. 1976); Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Etc., Local 638 v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir.
19775); Local 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See
generally GORMAN, supra note 3, at 264-69; Secondary Boycott, supra note 42, at 1363; Job
Security, supra note 42, at 1000. Contract clauses which purport to acquire work which has
traditionally been performed by employees of other employers, so called work acquisition
clauses, have been held to violate the NLRA for the same reasons. Heavy, Highway, Bldg.
and Constr. Teamsters Comm. for N. Cal., 227 N.L.R.B. 269 (1976).
11 99 L.R.R.M. at 1584-86; see National Woodwork Mrf's Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612,
644-45 (1967).
" 99 L.R.R.M. at 1583.
" Id. at 1585.
7o Id. at 1587-88.
7' The existence of the collective bargaining relationship was stipulated. Id. at 1581-82.
72 Id. at 1588.
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In three companion cases decided by the NLRB involving similar agree-
ments, the NLRB applied the same analysis used in Carpenters, Local 944
to determine the legality of the agreements under section 8(e) of the
NLRA. In Operating Engineers, Local 701,73 the NLRB found the requisite
existing collective bargaining relationship7" but held that the agreement
was not protected by the section 8(e) proviso because the agreement con-
tained a provision permitting the union to use economic power to enforce
the subcontracting clause.75 In Building and Construction Trades
Council, 71 the NLRB found the collective bargaining relationship sufficient
for section 8(e) proviso purposes even though the unions did not represent
a majority of the employees covered by the agreements.7 The NLRB held
that when a union is seeking a prehire agreement in anticipation of becom-
ing the bargaining representative under section 8(f) of the NLRA, 5 such a
relationship is sufficient to fulfill the collective bargaining relationship
requirement of Connell." However, the NLRB found this clause violative
of section 8(e) because the clause also contained a self-help enforcement
provision similar to the one in Operating Engineers, Local 701.0 In
13 99 L.R.R.M. 1589 (1978).
1, Id. at 1591. The collective bargaining relationship was stipulated in the facts. Id. at
1590. The Board cited Carpenters, Local 944 as authority for holding that a collective bargain-
ing relationship is sufficient for section 8(e) proviso protection. Id. at 1591.
11 Id. at 1593. The use of self-help measures to enforce union signatory subcontracting
clauses is not protected by the NLRA. See, e.g., Heavy, Highway, Bldg. & Constr. Teamsters
Comm. for N. Cal., 227 N.L.R.B. 269 (1976); Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 839, 842 (1965),
enforced sub nom., NLRB v. IBEW, Local 769, 405 F.2d 159, 162-63 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969). Rather, the union must seek judicial enforcement. Griffith Co.
v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1976).
76 99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978).
7 Id. at 1597-98.
7 Section 8(f) of the NLRA exempts agreements between employers and unions with less
than majority support in the construction industry from unfair labor practice prohibitions of
section 8(a) and (b) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). The Board noted that 8(f), like
the 8(e) construction proviso, was designed to accomodate the unique situation in the con-
struction industry where contractors and subcontractors are in close relationship on the
jobsite, employment is sporadic in nature, and employers need a ready supply of skilled
employees and advance information concerning labor costs. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1599; see Na-
tional Woodwork Mfr's Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). The Board stated that the
coordination of 8(f) and the section 8(e) proviso was reasonable, and concluded that the 8(e)
proviso did not require a majority union representative. The Board reasoned that a union, as
collective bargaining representative under 8(f), had the same interest in restricting subcon-
tracting in order to protect continuity of work and fringe benefits for the employees and to
insure stable and harmonious jobsite relations, as a union that possessed majority support
and had been certified by the Board under election procedure of section 9(a) of the NLRA.
99 L.R.R.M. at 1599. The Board further stated that although the Connell Court did not speak
to the type of collective bargaining relationship that would or would not be sufficient, Connell
nevertheless implied that an 8(f) relationship would be sufficient. Id.
1' Id. at 1599. The Board concluded that the union was seeking an 8(f) relationship
because the agreement it sought with the employer was complete, setting forth wages and
other terms and conditions of employment. Id.
" Id. at 1600. The Board had previously held that subcontracting agreements may not
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Colorado Building and Construction Trades Council,8' the NLRB con-
cluded that since there was no collective bargaining relationship between
the union and employer 2 and the union did not seek the subcontracting
agreement to alleviate the problems posed by the common situs relation-
ships on a particular jobsite or the reduction of friction between union and
nonunion employees on a jobsite,m the subcontracting agreement was not
protected by the construction proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA.5 4
In these four cases, the NLRB focused directly on the section 8(e)
proviso to determine whether the subcontracting agreements violated the
NLRA. However, when cases involving union-employer agreements similar
to those found in these cases are brought before a court on antitrust
grounds, courts will have to decide whether such agreements come within
the labor exemption. Although the Connell Court indicated that the non-
statutory labor exemption may automatically immunize all union-
employer agreements from the reach of antitrust prohibitions, before such
an extension of the exemption is adopted the courts should consider the
serious implications of such a decision.
The extension of the nonstatutory exemption to include automatically
any union-employer agreement permitted by the NLRA could result in
protection of agreements from antitrust liability that violate the antitrust
laws where the effect of the activity is neither a goal of the federal labor
policy 6 nor a necessary effect of the elimination of competition among
workers." The nonstatutory exemption developed through the courts' ac-
be enforced by coercion and that 8(e) proviso protection is lost where contract terms permit
strikes or other economic pressure for enforcement of secondary agreements. See International
Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 12, 220 N.L.R.B. 530 (1975); Fresno, Madera, Kings and
Tulare Counties Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 218 N.L.R.B. 39 (1975); note 76 supra.
91 99 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1978).
82 Id.
11 Id. at 1604. The Connell Court stated that the 8(e) proviso would perhaps protect
agreements limited to a particular jobsite. 421 U.S. at 633.
" 99 L.R.R.M. at 1604. The Board determined that the subcontracting clause was sec-
ondary because its object was to aid and assist union members generally and was not intended
to aid the employees in the contractual unit. Id. at 1603; see text accompanying notes 64-69
supra.
The Connell Court, consistent with its interpretation of 8(e), held that the agreement
between Local 100 and Connell did not come within the parameters of section 8(e) of the
NLRA because that agreement was outside the context of a collective bargaining agreement
and not limited to a particular jobsite. 421 U.S. at 635. The Court also concluded that labor
law remedies were not intended to be exclusive for section 8(e) violations. Id. at 634. A logical
implication, therefore, of these determinations is that activity that comes within section 8(e)
is protected from antitrust liability. Such an implication gains support from the fact that
Congress authorized such agreements in the NLRA, and if Congress had felt that they were
unacceptable, it would not have permitted them in a statute that was enacted long after the
Sherman Act under which the agreements would clearly be unlawful.
" See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
" If a court refuses to find antitrust liability whenever the union acts lawfully under the
NLRA, the union may then achieve by legal means precisely the same result condemned by
Connell, direct restraint on and elimination of competition in the product market. For exam-
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knowledgments that the national labor policy requires acceptance of some
anticompetitive effects in the business market." However, the extent of
tolerance of anticompetitive effects in the business market should bear a
direct relation to the goals of the national labor policy. 89 This approach
would be consistent with judicial decisions concerning the application of
the nonstatutory exemption to union-employer agreements from antitrust
liability." The fact that the subject matter of the agreement is not prohib-
ited under labor law9 or that it is a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining" should not necessarily guarantee the protection afforded by the
exemption. Rather, the exemption should protect the agreement only if the
subject matter of the agreement is intimately related to wages, hours, and
working conditions93 and will not potentially restrain competition in ways
that would follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages
and working conditions. 4 Thus, extension of the nonstatutory exemption
to protect any union-employer agreement permitted by the NLRA, if read
literally, would require the reversal of prior judicial decisions as well as
repeal of the antitrust laws to an extent not warranted by national labor
policy,
Before extending the nonstatutory exemption to protect any union-
employer agreement permitted by the NLRA, courts should also consider
pie, if Local 100 represented the general contractor's employees, Local 100 could approach
each general contractor with the same agreement as the one in Connell. Such agreements
would fall within the section 8(e) proviso because of the collective bargaining relationship.
Thus, the union would be protected by the nonstatutory exemption from antitrust liability
though the market impact would be the same. See Note, Antitrust - Labor Law -Labor Union
Subject to Antitrust Liability as Well as Unfair Labor Practice Remedies When Its Unlawful
Activity Directly Affects the Marketplace, 1976 Wisc. L. REV. 271, 286 n.83.
0 See text accompanying notes 6, 14-16 supra.
,' See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622
(1975); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 692-93 (1965).
0 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); UMW
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797'(1945).
1' UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
92 Id.
11 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965).
In a concurring opinion in Jewel Tea and a dissenting opinion in Pennington, Justice Gold-
berg, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, suggested that all collective bargaining activity
on mandatory subjects of bargaining should be exempt from antitrust liability. That test,
however, has never been adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court. See Mackey v. Na-
tional Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
" Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975).
The Connell Court, by holding that labor law remedies for violations of section 8(e)
are not exclusive, made clear its view that federal labor law legislation has not wholly dis-
placed the Sherman Act. 421 U.S. at 634. To have held otherwise would have violated the
established judicial principle permitting a statutory repeal by implication only under the
clearest of circumstances. See, e.g., Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968). See also J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.09 (4th ed. 1972); Meltzer, supra note 3, at 701-21.
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the inequities that could occur from such an extension. In cases involving
similar agreements, one agreement may be permissible under the applica-
ble NLRA provision but the other agreement may not because of some
technicality, and liability might turn on that technicality. The unfairness
of this result is apparent from the labor cases discussed above. In those
cases, the subcontracting agreements would have similar effects of lessen-
ing competition in the product market by limiting the number of subcon-
tractors who could perform the work the general contractor was seeking to
have done. However, in Operating Engineers and Building and Construc-
tion Trades Council," the NLRB held that the subcontracting clauses did
not come within the 8(e) proviso because an additional clause that pro-
vided for enforcement of the subcontracting clause by economic force, such
as striking or picketing, violated the labor principle that the union must
use judicial action to enforce their agreements and therefore may not resort
to self-help measures. 7 To extend the nonstatutory exemption to protect
only those agreements permitted by a literal reading of the NLRA would
subject those two unions to antitrust liability and not others even though
the anticompetitive effects of the business market were the same. Although
labor unions might benefit from such an inflexible rule, the application of
the antitrust laws to result in such inequities outweighs any benefits such
a rule would accrue to the unions.
A third result the courts should consider before extending the nonstatu-
tory exemption is the additional burden such an extension would place on
the judicial system. To protect any union-employer agreement permitted
by the NLRA would require a determination of the parameters of the
NLRA. That determination would require courts to either analyze and
interpret the NLRA to determine if the agreement was permitted under
the applicable provision or accept the interpretation and analysis of the
NLRB. Neither is an effective alternative. The NLRB has exclusive juris-
diction for interpreting and enforcing the NLRA9 and if courts engage in
their own interpretation of the Act, inconsistent interpretation and appli-
cation of the NLRA may result. Such a result is particularly possible in
cases involving anticompetitive conduct because courts will consider all
the economic ramifications of particular constructions, whereas the NLRB
is only concerned with the effect on the labor segment. Connell and the
labor cases discussed above provide good examples of the inconsistencies
that may arise. Connell held that the subcontracting agreement did not
come within the 8(e) proviso because it was neither made within the con-
text of a collective bargaining relationship nor limited to a particular job-
site. " The NLRB defined the parameters of the 8(e) proviso to deny protec-
tion for agreements that met the Connell test but which also included an
" See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
"7 99 L.R.R.M. at 1600; see note 75 supra.
'9 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156 (1976). See generally Goimus, supra note 3, at 7-39.
11 421 U.S. at 635.
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additional clause permiting economic enforcement of the subcontracting
agreement. 00 The NLRB also stretched the meaning of collective bargain-
ing relationship to include a dubious 8(f) relationship in order to afford
protection under 8(e).'1' This disparity in the determination of the parame-
ters of the NLRA could have a significant impact on a union's antitrust
liability should the nonstatutory exemption protect agreements permitted
by the literal language of the NLRA. On the other hand, if the courts give
complete deference to the NLRB's interpretation of the scope of the NLRA
provisions,' 2 the NLRB would be in the position of judging cases involving
union activity which had serious anticompetitive effects in the product
market, with the decision resting on the labor policy without regard to
antitrust policy.' 3
After considering the serious problems an extension of the nonstatutory
labor exemption could create, the logical conclusion should be to continue
to balance the conflicting policies in light of the facts of each case to
determine antitrust liability. In balancing the two policies, the courts
should weigh the legitimacy of the union's objective,' 4 the means em-
,* See Operating Eng'rs, Local 701, 99 L.R.R.M. 1589, 1593 (1978); Building & Constr.
Trades Council, 99 L.R.R.M. 1593, 1600 (1978).
,o, Building & Constr. Trades Council, 99 L.R.R.M. 1593, 1599-1600 (1978); see text
accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
'1 The NLRB's interpretation and application of the NLRA are entitled to weight in
doubtful situations. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692
(1951); see NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 542, 532 F.2d 902 (3d
Cir. 1976).
10 See Marriot Corp. v. Great Am. Serv. Trades Council, 552 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1977);
Meltzer, supra note 3, at 696-700.
"1 Legitimate union objectives include the elimination of competition over wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, organization of employees, maintenance of
area standards, and the preservation of work for union members. See Recent Developments
- Labor Law - Supreme Court Holds That Labor Unions Are Not Exempt From Antitrust
Statutes, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 196 (1975). The "self-interest" of a union and its members
has been treated as synonomous with the legitimate objects of organized labor. Republic
Prods., Inc. v. American Federation of Musicians, 245 F. Supp. 475, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The
"legitimate object" phrasing undoubtedly came from section 6 of the Clayton Act which
proscribes interference with members of the labor organization and labor organizations them-
selves "carrying out the legitimate objects thereof." See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); Great At. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 88, 410 F.2d 650,653 (8th Cir. 1969). The
"self-interest" test noted in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), was initially
interpreted to include anyghing that would inure to the benefit of the union. See, e.g., Hunt
v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 825 (1945). Self-interest since has been interpreted to mean
anything that comes within the scope of the legitimate objects of labor or anything concerned
with a labor dispute. "The test of whether labor union action is or is not within the prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act is (1) whether the action is in the union's self-interest in an area
which is a proper subject of union concern .. " Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp.
v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884, 887 (2d Cir. 1970). See generally GoRmAN, supra
note 3, at 296-325; Winter, supra note 3, at 44; Meltzer, supra note 3, at 659; see also Willis,
In Defense of the Court: Accomodation of Conflicting National Policies, Labor and the Anti-
trust Laws, 22 MERCER L. REv. 561, 566-78 (1971).
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ployed to achieve that objective,"5 and whether the activities and their
effects comport with the goals of the national labor policy' 6 against the
extent of the anticompetitive effect those activities have on the product
market. After a court considers whether union activity comes within the
labor exemption and concludes that the union-employer agreement does
not, the court must then apply antitrust analysis to determine whether
there has been a violation of antitrust laws.10
7
The courts have struggled with labor's exemption from the antitrust
laws for many years in an attempt to preserve flexibility in antitrust cases.
Although labor unions might benefit from an inflexible rule fixing the
boundaries of labor's exemption, courts' need for flexibility to guard the
public interest in maintaining some semblence of free market competition
makes such a delineation undesirable. If the courts adopt an interpretation
of Connell which extendsthe labor exemption from antitrust liability, an
inflexible rule may be created that would directly benefit the unions. The
courts would, however, substantially impair to an unacceptable degree
their ability to protect the competitive economy. Therefore, the courts
should maintain the balancing approach to determine a union's exemption
from antitrust liability to ensure their continued ability to strike a desira-
ble and constructive balance between the rights of labor and the need for
competition.
SUSAN M. YODER
'5 See generally GORMAN, supra note 3, at 296-325. The means a labor union may use to
achieve its objectives are limited by the NLRA. For example, section 8(b)(7) prohibits unions
from picketing an employer for recognitional or organizational reasons beyond an initial 30
day period without petitioning the NLRB for an election under 9(c) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(7) (1976); see note 53 supra. See generally GoRmAN, supra note 3, at 220-39.
101 See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
17 See note 2 supra. In construing the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has developed
a "rule of reason" approach to determine whether a given practice, agreement, or activity
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. Under this theory, only acts, contracts, agree-
ments, or combinations that operated to the prejudice of the public interest by undulying
restricting trade are deemed unlawful. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106, 175-80 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-62 (1911). Because of
the evidentiary problems involved in applying the rule of reason, courts recently have utilized
the rule of per se illegality, under which certain agreements are presumed to be unreasonable
without inquiry into the factual circumstances of each case. See, e.g., United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-18 (1940). Among the practices and agreements
held to be illegal per se, "because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue," Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), are price
fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, competitor exclusion and tying agreements. See
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-18 (1940); Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
85 F. 271 (1958). The agreements involved in Connell and the four labor cases involved group
boycotts and competitor exclusion and would therefore be illegal per se if the antitrust laws
are applied to labor unions in the same manner as they are to businesses. The remedies for a
violation of the antitrust laws depend upon the character of the litigation. See 15 U.S.C. §§
1-3, 15, 45 (1976).
1979] 1255

